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NEGOTIATED SOLAR RIGHTS CONFLICT RESOLUTION
I. INTRODUCTION
Most legal analyses of residential solar power conflicts either support or
assume the need for the statutory protection of solar investments. This
perspective arises from the theory of property rights efficiency — i.e.,
residents will only make expensive investments in solar panels if they have a
legally recognized protection to install a solar system receiving most of the
solar radiation passing over a neighbor’s land. Yet, underlying these disputes
is a tradeoff between two productive uses: (1) Vertical land development and
(2) the generation of electricity from solar panels.
Recent decades have seen the rise of state-level solar rights statutes,1
implying that the development-solar legal balancing act has tipped in favor of
solar owners. However, looking at individual disputes, both vertical
development and solar often could make compelling normative claims to the
efficiency of property protections via a servitude upon the other. The Coase
Theorem2 clarifies that to whom rights are initially assigned is likely
immaterial with respect to efficient outcomes in neighbor-versus-neighbor
conflicts; with low transaction costs, the highest-valued user will end up with
the property right after bargaining. Without property rights, however, this
market cannot function.3 So, there is a legal-theoretical basis, grounded in
promoting efficient use, for the statutory assignment of solar rights. This
article builds upon an argument that the preceding efficiency-based rationale
is too simplified to inform a legal analysis of solar statutes.
Although statutes are a simple and direct way to assign solar property
rights, it does not necessarily follow that statutes are simple and direct to
enforce. This article argues that the enforcement of solar statutes through
courts is far more costly than many solar-statute advocates may recognize.
Recent amendments to solar statutes in California, as this article will explain,
are revealing that California’s heretofore-nation-leading government is

1

Evan J. Rosenthal, Letting the Sunshine In: Protecting Residential Access to Solar
Energy in Common Interest Developments, 40 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 995, 1004 (2013).
2
R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960).
3
Schmid, A. Allan, Government, Property, Markets . . . In That Order . . . Not
Government Versus Markets, in THE FUNDAMENTAL INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN
GOVERNMENT AND PROPERTY, 237-41 (Nicholas Mercuro and Warren Samuel eds., JAI
Press 1999).
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largely abdicating its enforcement role. As will be discussed, California is
shifting the burden of enforcement to private disputants at the local level.
Enforcement issues have important implications for the implied
efficiency of assigning solar property rights, but recent trends also pose an
opportunity for normative institutional design that could potentially promote
more effective dispute processing. The Coase Theorem4 makes clear that
when enforcement costs are high or prohibitive, then the property rights
efficiency argument cannot fully be realized as promised.5 This article will
show that the most effective solution to the solar-rights enforcement problem
is that governments should redirect energy to promoting local negotiation
mechanisms.
This thesis builds on the lessons from recent legal cases and scholarship
on solar conflicts within common interest developments (“CID”). A key
conflict in this arena, which settled in 2008, garnered national media
attention and spurred state-level legislative action.6 More recently, a set of
conflicts made the news in Coachella Valley, as fees imposed by
homeowners associations on solar projects created local-level disputes.7
Unfortunately for the researcher, these conflicts are by nature difficult to
detect empirically and to assess quantitatively. One anticipates that most of
these conflicts have occurred without record because it is likely they are
being resolved through private negotiation and/or via a community dispute
resolution process.
The legal outcomes of these cases are driven by an institutional conflict
between community-level covenants, conditions, and restrictions
4

Coase, supra note 2.
Joshua M. Duke, Property Rights and the Environment, 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ENERGY,
NATURAL RESOURCES, AND ENVIRONMENT, 75-79 (Jason Shogren, ed. 2013).
6
Felicity Barringer, Trees Block Solar Panels, and a Feud Ends in Court, New York
Times (April 7, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/07/science/earth/07redwood.html?pagewanted=all&_r
=0.
7
Sammy Roth, Some Homeowners Associations Make It Difficult to Go Solar, THE
DESERT SUN (May 18, 2015),
http://www.desertsun.com/story/tech/science/energy/2015/05/18/homeownersassociations-solar/27416213/.
5
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(“CC&Rs”), and rights assigned by solar statutes. To preview the result,
courts are turning to a “reasonableness”8 standard to determine when CC&Rs
go too far; this implies that solar rights are limited, leaving it to judges and
juries to determine the appropriate outcome in the development-solar
balancing act. This article will argue that private litigation in courts is,
relatively, poorly positioned to make this balance effectively. Instead, a
market or mediated solution is likely better, albeit imperfect.
This paper uses a comparative institutional analysis9 of an actual solar
conflict in California. The case is Tesoro del Valle Master Homebuilders
Association v. Griffin,10 and involves the placement of a residential solar
system in a residential development. The analysis supports the normative
argument that the best of the imperfect conflict resolution processes may be
for the states to: assign rights via statutes, but also support a more flexible
enforcement approach based on local dispute-resolution norms and formal
mechanisms. The local processes may be based on markets (Coasean11
bargaining) or on informal norms (Ellickson12). Further, if these local, private
negotiations are promoted and facilitated by governments, it ultimately may
help lower the costs of reaching agreement between neighbors, ensuring
efficient outcomes and allowing for more substantive participation by the
disputing private parties than litigation-based enforcement.
II. BACKGROUND
The legal protection of solar rights dates to the Roman era, in which civil
laws required a builder to have “servitude over neighboring land if he were
not to leave his neighbors a minimum or reasonable amount of daylight.”13
As early as 1865, Robert Kerr, the nineteenth-century London architect who
8

Tesoro Del Valle Master Homeowners Association v. Martin Griffin, 200 Cal. App. 4th
619 (2011).
9
NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994).
10
Tesoro del Valle Master Homeowners Assn. v. Griffin, 200 Cal. App. 4th 619, 630
(2011).
11
Coase, supra note 2.
12
ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (Harv. U. Press eds., 1st ed. 1991).
13
See Stephen Christopher Unger, Note, Ancient Lights in Wrigleyville: An Argument for
the Unobstructed View of a National Pastime, 38 IND. L.J. 533, 542–43 (2005). See also
Borimir Jordan & John Perlin, Solar Energy Use and Litigation in Ancient Times, 1
SOLAR L. REP. 583, 592–93 (1979).
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authored On Ancient Lights and the Evidence of Surveyors Thereon,
summarized the common law of “ancient lights”.14 His analysis points to the
conflict between property rights and highest-and-best-use land development
in London during this time.15 Statutory protection of right to “ancient lights”
originates from the general statutes in the Prescription Act of 1832, which
codified absolute rights to light after twenty years of access.16
Most early American courts, however, “unanimously repudiated the
doctrine of ancient lights, with opinions reflecting the feeling that the
protection of access to sunlight was not suited to a new and growing country
because it would hinder the development of land.”17 Generally, U.S. courts
favored intensive development over a protection from obstruction of light,18
but a few states previously “guaranteed landowners access to sunlight
through recognition of prescriptive easements under this English doctrine.”19
A leading example of favored development occurred in 1959 when the
Florida District Court of Appeals ruled in Fontainebleau Hotel Corporation
v. Forty-five Twenty-five, Inc. that there is no legal right to air and sunlight:

14

ROBERT KERR, ON ANCIENT LIGHTS AND THE EVIDENCE OF SURVEYORS THEREON
(Nabu Press eds., 1st 3d. 2010) (1865).
15
Id. at 1. (“As the value of house property has increased, disputes of this class have
become more common than ever, more difficult of settlement, and more expensive.
Serious complaints are made in all quarters--on the one hand, that vexatious litigants are
permitted by frivolous technicalities to hamper improvement where improvement ought
most to be encouraged; on the other, that bold speculators are able to override the rights
of less wealthy and more timid neighbours, the very class who most require protection.
Demands are made for legislative interference; and even Chancery judges confess
themselves bewildered in the subtleties of pleading, and the conflict of interests equally
entitled, not merely to legal respect, but to personal sympathy.”).
16
Prescription Act, 2 & 3 Will. 4 ch. 71 (1832).
17
Franklin Gevurtz, Obstruction of Sunlight as a Private Nuisance, 65 CAL. L. REV. 94,
105 (1977) (According to Gevurtz, “the doctrine of ancient lights is essentially the
recognition of a prescriptive easement to light and air.”).
18
Venuto v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 22 Cal. App. 3d 116, 127 (1971), 99 Cal.
Rptr. 350, 357-58 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).
19
Tawny L. Alvarez, Don't Take My Sunshine Away: Right-to-Light and Solar Energy in
the Twenty-First Century, 28 PACE L. REV. 535, 538 (2008).
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“No American decision has been cited, and independent
research has revealed none, in which it has been held that — in the
absence of some contractual or statutory obligation — a landowner
has a legal right to the free flow of light and air across the adjoining
land of his neighbor. Even at common law, the landowner had no
legal right, in the absence of an easement or uninterrupted use and
enjoyment for a period of 20 years, to unobstructed light and air
from the adjoining land. Blumberg v. Weiss, 1941, 129 N.J. Eq. 34,
17 A.2d 823; 1 Am.Jur., Adjoining Landowners, § 51. And the
English doctrine of "ancient lights" has been unanimously
repudiated in this country. 1 Am.Jur., Adjoining Landowners, § 49,
p. 533; Lynch v. Hill, 1939, 24 Del. Ch. 86, 6 A.2d 614, overruling
Clawson v. Primrose, 4 Del. Ch. 643. There being, then, no legal
right to the free flow of light and air from the adjoining land, it is
universally held that where a structure serves a useful and
beneficial purpose, it does not give rise to a cause of action, either
for damages or for an injunction under the maxim sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas, even though it causes injury to another by
cutting off the light and air and interfering with the view that would
otherwise be available over adjoining land in its natural state,
regardless of the fact that the structure may have been erected
20
partly for spite.”

The Fontainbleau court also noted that when a structure serves an
efficient purpose, it cannot give rise to nuisance action for injunction or
damages, even in the event of “irreparable injury.”21 The historical U.S.
common law rule therefore largely supports vertical land development but
inadvertently creates disincentives for landowners to adopt solar
photovoltaics (PV) power systems.22

20

Fontainebleau Hotel Corporation v Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357, 359
(Fla. Ct. App. 1959).
21
Id. at 358-59.
22
This article does not focus on a purely common law approach to determining solar
rights, using principles of nuisance as a defense against vertical development, but instead
it explores the implications of the new wave of statutes that have already assigned clear
solar rights. The focus is on the roles of transaction, and especially enforcement, costs
and the relative ability of dispute resolution procedures to resolve U.S. solar rights
conflicts efficiently and cost effectively. Common law solutions were sufficient until
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Solar disputes are by nature spatially localized problems. These disputes
might be better resolved through local or bilateral solutions than by one-sizefits-all standards. It is possible that state-level uniform standards awarding
rights to solar parties could prevent some socially efficient vertical
development, if neighbors are unable to reach an agreement. Solar statutes
also implicitly grant veto or holdout power to solar owners in preventing
vertical development. State-level legislative action further can be ineffective
if high monitoring and enforcement costs prevent authorities from readily
protecting the PV owner’s solar right, and these authorities are unlikely to do
so when they are far removed from the conflict. Further, it is the disputants
themselves that have the best information about the conflict, their values, and
neighborhood welfare. Finally, statutory enforcement ignores the power of a
community to resolve its own disputes. These points align Coasean resolution
with Robert Ellickson’s view that people often find that the cost of
submitting to formal dispute resolution is too high, such that they would
rather resolve these issues on a local, informal basis.23

technological advances triggered an incompatibility between high-rise buildings (and
other sun-blockers such as trees) and the rise of rooftop-mounted and other solar
photovoltaics (“PVs”). The boom in residential solar PV installations raises the stakes in
the right to light debate because these systems represent valuable property — a revenue
stream in the form of on-site electricity generation, resulting grid energy savings, and
potential net-energy metering benefits (depending on state statutes in the particular
location). A purely common law dispute processing, having evolved in the United States,
is clearly a highly inadequate solution and has been progressively replaced by statutory
protection for sunlight in the form of solar access laws that protect solar PV installations.
In contrast to instances where statutes simply codify common law rules, solar has
witnessed the opposite pattern. In short, the trend has been to use statutes to create
relatively uniform standards that work against the common law rule. This uniformity
could potentially prevent conflict by aligning expectations for all disputants.
23
See Coase, supra note 2; ELLICKSON, supra note 12; Bryan Caplan, Robert Ellickson’s
Order without Law: A Review, GEORGE MASON UNIV. (October 1992),
http://econfaculty.gmu.edu/bcaplan/ellick.htm (stating that “[n]ot only is legislation
unnecessary for law, but law is unnecessary for order. After studying dispute resolution
among ranchers and farmers in Shasta County, California, Ellickson came to realize that
most people find the costs of learning about the law (judge-made or statutory) and
submitting to formal resolution procedures to be so high that it is easier to fall back on
common-sense norms. He finds that all three of the functions of law - dispute resolution,
rule formation, and enforcement - get supplied by means of these informal norms.”).
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The foregoing argument raises the possibility that statutory rights
assignment and centralized government enforcement may be less effective
than statutory rights with a more localized dispute resolution process. The
tension arises in balancing the enforcement costs of the former approach with
the transaction and negotiation costs of the latter. If these costs are highly
asymmetric, then this creates a comparative institutional analysis problem24
with differential impacts in terms of efficiency and access to participation.
Therefore, a single institutional analysis of statutory enforcement will not be
sufficient to result in a meaningful conclusion — i.e., statutory enforcement
is costly and thus local negotiations are automatically superior. Instead, this
article presents a comparative institutional analysis between the public
solution of statutory enforcement and the private, markets-based solution of
community-level dispute resolution, analyzing the strengths and weaknesses
of both processes and drawing a conclusion about the best of two imperfect25
dispute processing mechanisms. The results of the analysis highlight the
potential efficiency gains that result when these disputes are resolved using
localized negotiation inspired by Coase and Ellickson.26
This article offers a new perspective on solar rights and environmental
dispute resolution, focusing on the community level. The comparative
institutional analysis27,28 examines a case study, Tesoro del Valle Master
Homebuilders Association v. Griffin,29 and draws comparisons between the
enforcement issues associated with statutes and the community dispute
resolution process. This community dispute resolution process developed
herein is a local one, in that neighbors would participate and could use
CC&Rs as preemptory instruments. In addition, local boards or community
planning organizations could assist with enforcement of solar rights disputes.
The motivation for the community dispute resolution approach is similar to
that of alternative dispute resolution processes; those with the best
24

See KOMESAR, supra note 9.
See KOMESAR, supra note 9.
26
See Coase, supra note 2. ELLICKSON, supra note 12.
27
See KOMESAR, supra note 9.
28
Joshua. M. Duke and L. A. Csoboth, Increased Scientific Capacity and Endangered
Species Management: Lessons from the Red Wolf Conflict, 8 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 539,
552 (2003) (this article extends the Komesar version of comparative institutional
analysis).
29
Tesoro del Valle Master Homeowners Assn. v. Griffin, 200 Cal. App. 4th 619, 630
(2011).
25

8

JOURNAL OF ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY LAW VOL. 22, NO. 1
information (i.e., solar owners and their neighbors) should also be
incentivized and empowered to lead conflict resolution. The analysis also
suggests an important hypothesis: that the “insurance policy” provided by
statutes to solar owners — protecting the value of solar investments — is
potentially of less value to the property right holder than the certainty of
market behavior when one considers the failures of the real world’s costly
enforcement.
Evan J. Rosenthal30 and others have described the composition of solar
access laws and their roles in community-level governance. Our argument
builds upon several scholars, who have argued against the use of the courts in
enforcing solar rights statutes, citing deficiencies and high inefficiency.31,32
At the same time, others have argued that common law33,34 and property
30

Rosenthal, supra note 1, at 1006.
See John William Gergacz, Legal Aspects of Solar Energy: Statutory Approaches for
Access to Sunlight, 10 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 29 (1982) (“Fifth, the Act's reliance
on the judiciary to resolve disputes may not be the most equitable method. These
problems are serious deficiencies and point out that California's answer to the issues of
solar access is far from satisfactory.”).
32
See Sara C. Bronin, Solar Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1217, 1265 (2009) (“After a review
of the judicial developments with respect to nuisance, prescriptive easements, and
implied easements, it is difficult to imagine that courts could ever become fully engaged
with the development of a solar rights regime. Even if courts suddenly became receptive
to solar rights, litigation would be a poor strategy for solar rights seekers for many
reasons, including the uncertainty of the outcome and the related transaction costs. Rather
than repeating "ancient" debates about ancient lights and other topics, modern scholars
should shift their focus away from the courts.”).
33
See Shawn M. Lyden, An Integrated Approach to Solar Access, 34 Case W. L. Rev.
367, 368 (1984) (“Unfortunately, the common law affords little or no protection to a
landowner's interest in access to sunlight. Courts have historically shown great reluctance
to interfere with land use on the basis of something ‘so impalpable and fleeting as air and
light.’").
34
See Scott F. Stromberg, Has the Sun Set on Solar Rights? Examining the Practicality of
the Solar Rights Act, 50 NAT. RESOURCES J. 211, 212-13 (2010) (“Unfortunately, the
common law and express easements adopted in other states have been shown to offer
little protection to solar users who require access to solar energy. Some courts have been
unwilling to protect access to solar energy through common law legal theories, due in
part to the limitation that solar access will place on the development of adjacent
properties…The failure of common law and express easements to protect solar access
leaves the solar user without a right to access solar energy and, thereby, discourages its
implementation.”).
31
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law35 poorly process right to light conflicts. Some have also advocated for
various degrees of involvement of local and municipal governments36,37 in
inspiring private negotiation of easements, and yet others have discussed the
role of norms in solar rights disputes.38 This paper builds upon these legal
analyses, adding a comparative analysis of the underappreciated but critical
differences in enforcement costs of statutes and transaction costs of
negotiation. This “cost asymmetry” has important implications for the
potential role for community governance to play in dispute resolution
regarding solar installations in master planned communities. As demonstrated
in the comparative institutional analysis of the Tesoro v. Griffin case
presented here, the high enforcement costs of statutes raise the possibility that
the relatively low transaction costs of local negotiation will be the most
efficient and equitable solution to residential solar rights conflicts. This
argument therefore brings together three threads of legal analysis: (1) the
existing literature’s concerns about solar-enforcement, (2) the Coasean39
notion that private bargains will be superior to mandated, uniform outcomes,

35

Troy A. Rule, Property Rights and Modern Energy, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 803, 836
(2013) (“In these settings, courts and policymakers must be cautious not to unfairly or
inefficiently redistribute existing property interests in their effort to promote new forms
of energy development . . . as policymakers seek to adapt property law to the realities of
the modern energy sector.”).
36
See Ellis Raskin, The Definitive Guide to Tree Disputes in California, 21 HASTINGS
W.-N.W. J. ENV. L. & POL’Y 113, 124 (2015). (“Absent any municipal ordinances that
guarantee otherwise, property owners do not have the right to light and air unobstructed
by trees. The only exceptions are when the blockage of sunlight is malicious or if the
trees obstruct a solar easement granted under the Solar Shade Control Act.”).
37
Alexandra B. Klass, Property Rights on the New Frontier: Climate Change, Natural
Resource Development, and Renewable Energy, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 63, 66-67 (2011)
(“In recent years, state and local governments have in many cases adopted historical
natural resource development approaches to solar and wind by defining leasehold estates,
easements, and other property interests in solar and wind rights. … In these efforts, states
are hoping to spur development and create more certainty in investment…”).
38
See R. Lisle Baker, My Tree versus Your Solar Collector or Your Well versus My
Septic System? – Exploring Responses to Beneficial but Conflicting Neighboring Uses of
Land, 37 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 1 (2010) (“[R]esolving conflicts between
neighboring beneficial uses of land would be aided by guidelines which might be
grounded . . . with a sense that rough justice is being served. Two such norms appear
helpful: priority in time and examining which of the two beneficial uses appears to be the
more intrusive . . . .”).
39
See Coase, supra note 2.
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and (3) the Elicksonian40 notion that local, informal negotiation may be
superior to one-size-fits-all standards.
III. SOLAR RIGHTS STATUTES
Solar rights statutes establish and delimit the rights of solar owners. There
are a variety of types of these laws, from acts that prevent solar owners from
being forced to endure shade, to mechanisms for creating easements to
enabling statutes for the creation of local ordinances. In some states, these
statutes provide the framework for solar easements to be contracted between
two parties.41 Though the solar-owner property rights enumerated are
substantive, the rights are more limited than some might realize — for
instance, via CC&Rs. Further, the burden of enforcing these rights largely
falls upon the owner, despite some instances in the past where the
government took an active role in enforcement.
Rosenthal42 recently advanced the literature on understanding solar rights
statutes. Rosenthal found that, “as of 2012, forty states ha[d] some form of
solar access law,” twenty-one of which “specifically addressed CC&Rs that
‘effectively prohibit’ or ‘unreasonably interfere’ with a homeowner’s ability
to install” a solar system.43 Despite the statutes, little judicial interpretation
exists; Rosenthal wrote that despite the “323,600 association-governed
40

See ELLICKSON, supra note 12.
Rosenthal, supra note 1, at 998. (“These laws are diverse in makeup but can provide a
number of rights and protections, including: the right to install a solar device on a
property subject to countervailing building codes or local ordinances; the creation of a
solar easement; and provisions mandating the removal of vegetation that blocks sunlight.
Twenty-one states have also specifically addressed CC&Rs that ‘effectively prohibit’ or
‘unreasonably interfere’ with a homeowner's ability to install a solar energy generation
system.”).
42
See id.
43
Id. at 998 (“As of 2012, forty states have some form of solar access law on their books,
with some local governments taking action as well. These laws are diverse in makeup but
can provide a number of rights and protections, including: the right to install a solar
device on a property subject to countervailing building codes or local ordinances; the
creation of a solar easement; and provisions mandating the removal of vegetation that
blocks sunlight. Twenty-one states have also specifically addressed CC&Rs that
‘effectively prohibit’ or ‘unreasonably interfere’ with a homeowner's ability to install a
solar energy generation system.”).
41
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communities in the United States containing some 25.9 million housing
units” in 2012,44 there is a relatively thin basis of case law featuring
homeowner versus prohibitive CC&Rs.45 Rosenthal summarized the power
of CC&Rs:
Community associations are, to a large extent, right to
feel so empowered. When a homeowner within a CID wishes
to undertake a home improvement project — such as a solar
installation —CC&Rs will often require the homeowner to
seek prior approval from the association's governing board.
Courts are highly deferential to the decisions made by these
boards; many courts apply a form of the business judgment
rule when assessing an association board's decision. Common
law principles also strongly favor the enforceability of private
contractual agreements, including CC&Rs. In the end, as one
commentator noted, "more than likely, community
associations will win in court if the family agreed to rules
when joining a community.”46
Rosenthal studied these sources of law and made recommendations
regarding how solar access laws might be strengthened to protect solar rights
more effectively.47
This leads to a key point in our article. CC&Rs significantly limit solar
rights by allowing these rights to be suspended by the community and
requiring the solar owner to either seek enforcement or defend him or herself
in court if a CID association seeks to challenge these rights. Further, courts
have adopted a standard of reasonableness in determining what limitations
44

Id. at 1000 (“As of 2012, there were 323,600 association-governed communities in the
United States containing some 25.9 million housing units.”).
45
Id. at 1003 (“Despite the board member's warning, there is a scant body of case law
featuring homeowners seeking judicial approval of a solar project in the face of
prohibitive CC&Rs and/or an adverse decision by an association board. Homeowners
may simply abandon plans for a solar device in the face of potential legal hurdles,
figuring that the up-front costs of installation are substantial enough as is before factoring
in legal fees, as well (think Henry Homeowner). Others likely realize that any legal
challenge they could mount faces an uphill battle considering the deference courts give to
the decisions of community association boards.”).
46
Rosenthal, supra note 1, at 999 (footnotes omitted).
47
Id.
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are permissible. This standard is one that better matches a presumptive rights
regime and nuisance law rather than one where the solar rights have
ostensibly been allocated via statute.
Rosenthal argues that the precise and quantifiable definition of
reasonableness standards and the scope of the law, as well as the elimination
of provisions for restriction of solar installations on purely aesthetic grounds,
are necessary to implement effective solar rights legislation on a state level,48
thereby “divest[ing] the courts, to the greatest extent possible, of their
discretionary power in analyzing the ‘reasonableness’ of a community
association’s covenants, conditions, and restrictions pertaining to solar
energy use.”49 Rosenthal suggests that courts are regaining power from
community associations, which had previously “assumed a function
traditionally performed by state and local governments.”50
A. SCOPE OF SOLAR RIGHTS
The scope of Rosenthal’s article does not include the solar rights granted
through a parallel class of legislation regarding solar shading, pioneered by
the California Solar Shade Control Act.51 While shading was perhaps outside
the scope of his comprehensive review, it is important to note that the term
“solar rights” can refer to two different sources of conflict: the right to install
the panels in the first place, and the right to the light necessary for their
continued performance once installed.52 Installation rights are protected
under solar rights statutes as well as solar easements, which can be negotiated

48

Id. at 1007-09.
Id. at 1017.
50
Id. at 1008 (“Kristina Caffrey has suggested that in regulating the placement of solar
devices, community associations have essentially assumed a function traditionally
performed by state and local governments: ‘All the way back to Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty, state and local governments have told property owners what they can and
cannot do and where they can or cannot do it.’ Thus, courts could view solar access laws
as ‘taking back’ the responsibility of zoning and land use planning from community
associations.”).
51
Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 25980-86 (2015).
52
Rosenthal, supra note 1, at 998.
49
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between two private parties.53 Performance rights are protected under solar
shading legislation and local zoning ordinances.
From the perspective of a solar owner, the necessity for multiple layers of
protection stems from the multitude of dimensions on which installations can
vary, in the technical design qualities of the system, incentive policy benefits,
and other dimensions. In a formal negotiation of these dimensions, a
document summarizing the negotiated terms along each dimension would
serve a valuable purpose in creating a legally binding settlement. In the case
of future judicial dispute, the document could also be introduced as evidence
in subsequent litigation. Some of these dimensions are laid out in Table 1, a
sample worksheet table, developed for the purpose of delineating some of the
potential dimensions for the private negotiation of solar rights disputes
between neighbors.

53

Id. at 999.
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Table 1: Negotiable dimensions on which residential solar installations
can vary
Solar
Owner’s Right

Negotiable Dimension

Neighbor’s
Right

Nameplate Capacity of System
Number and surface area of panels
Location of panels
Azimuth (to prevent shading)
Degree of Shading (%)
SREC benefits
Tax Credit benefits
Solar rights at the end of system useful life
Solar Easement

This table reflects the diversity of potential rights associated with solar,
but it also presents a preliminary framework for normative recommendations
on negotiation. Both formal and informal negotiations between neighbors
could benefit from pre-identified parameters of rights negotiation. For
15
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example, neighbors could use this framework to negotiate side payments
from the solar owner to homes in viewshed of the system. Concurrently,
other neighbors may negotiate the terms of a solar easement in concert with a
side payment that comes in the form of a fixed proportion of annual energy
savings, thereby incentivizing the neighbor to maximize sunlight and output
to the solar owner’s system.
The initial assignment of these installation rights and performance rights
to both the solar owner and neighbor come in the form of solar rights
legislation, local zoning ordinances, solar easements, and CC&Rs. After
negotiation, the rights enumerated in the negotiation process become matters
of enforcement in the case of a violation.
B. Enforcement
One of the most important trends in solar rights is the evolution of how
property rights are enforced. The change in enforcement seems to be
traceable to a specific, high profile conflict that occurred in Northern
California in 2008.54 Although the conflict is relatively minor in substance, it
triggered significant controversial media coverage — most of which raised
concerns about the criminal prosecution of “developed” uses, which in this
case were redwood trees. In California prior to 2008, the Solar Shade
Control Act55 was enforced as a public nuisance carrying criminal
misdemeanor charges. In 2008, in California v. Bissett,56 a tree owner
refused to trim or remove trees that were shading a neighbor’s solar panels.
The public and media reaction seems to have led to an amendment to the
Solar Shade Act, as summarized by Day Anders and Adi Kuduk, that
considered violations a private nuisance requiring civil (rather than criminal)
enforcement:
“Before the Act’s amendment became effective on January 1,
2009, solar collector owners seeking to enforce the Act had to
have their claims prosecuted by a district attorney or other
prosecutor. This entailed demonstrating to the prosecutor that
a violation occurred, having the prosecutor deliver a thirty54

See Barringer, supra note 6.
Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 25980-86 (2015).
56
California v. Bissett, No. BB727255 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Santa Clara County Mar. 28, 2008).
55
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day abatement notice to the offending tree or shrub owner to
cure the violation, and finally prosecuting this person if the
violation was not abated within thirty days.
Now that violations of the Act are no longer
criminally prosecuted, the solar collector owner is solely
responsible for enforcing the protections afforded by the Act.
This is essentially a two-step process. First, the affected solar
collector owner must provide the tree or shrub owner written
notice requesting compliance with the requirements of
Section 25982. Second, if the tree or shrub owner fails to
comply with the written notice requesting compliance with
the Act, the affected solar collector owner may bring a private
nuisance suit under the Act against the negligent person to
remedy the solar shading.”57
In sum, this excerpt shows that, with respect to to the right to be free from
shading, the burden of enforcement shifted from the public to the private
solar owner.
While California has led the way in adopting solar rights legislation, the
frontier for the enforcement of solar rights is evolving and relatively
unexplored. To the skeptic, it might seem as though legislatures assigned
these solar rights with good intentions, but were not prepared to pay for the
costs of enforcing the law. Some statutes were not written with an explicit
enforcement role for the state, though others were. Currently, states are
pursuing one of the following strategies: (1) not enforcing solar rights; (2)
under-enforcing solar rights; (3) shifting enforcement burden to local
governments; or (4) shifting the enforcement burden to private parties.
Although these strategies lower the state government’s fiscal costs, the cost
of enforcement must be paid nonetheless. The owners of solar property
rights will either see costs of asserting and defending their rights, or they will
choose to not defend their rights at all — which is also costly. If they choose
to use the courts for enforcement, then that also imposes a social cost.

57

Scott Anders et. al., ‘Hey, Your Tree is Shading My Solar Panels:’ California’s Solar
Shade Control Act, 2 J. SUSTAINABLE REAL EST. 361, 368 (2010).
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No empirical literature could be identified indicating recent trends in
enforcement of solar rights. Thus, the authors conducted a brief and nonrepresentative set of phone contacts to state and local governments in
California.58 The contacts showed that many local governments do not have
experience with the enforcement of solar rights conflicts and, therefore, are
not taking an active role in pursuing enforcement. The phone conversations
suggest that it is likely that most of these disputes are being settled privately
between neighbors, outside the realm of government intervention — though
perhaps through judicial resolution. In many states with strong solar rights
legislation, including California, property rights are clearly defined.
Moreover, in private negotiation transactions costs are relatively low, and
therefore Coasean59 outcomes through bargaining are possible.
Another critical piece in the analysis of statutes is the high enforcement
costs for the judicial dispute resolution of statutorily assigned rights — i.e.,
litigation costs. These costs are likely very high, relative to the solar and
development values at stake, so it is not surprising that one finds little
appellate case law in this area.60 Governments could, but do not seem to,
actively police some of these conflicts. One could imagine the analog of a
building code inspector, enforcing violations. While the violation of solar
rights statutes has rarely been a criminal act, their enforcement, generally
through judicial dispute resolution processes, remains very costly. Without
government representation of their interests, these costs fall on the
disadvantaged party, i.e., the party that is losing in the status quo. There is a
significant asymmetry in the costs of formal legal action and selfenforcement, and there is an inherent bias towards the status quo, be it one in
which solar panel owners threaten the developed use, or vice versa. These
58

Addendum available upon request (on file with Benjamin Attia, Univ. of Del.).
See Coase, supra note 2.
60
Rosenthal, supra note 1, at 999 (“Considering the deferential treatment community
associations receive in the courts, the importance of solar access laws becomes clear-without them, homeowners face nearly impossible odds when challenging the adverse
decision of an association board. But can solar access laws turn the tide in favor of
homeowners? Despite the spread of statutes addressing solar rights, little case law
involving homeowners pitted against their associations has developed, perhaps due to
homeowners deciding to abandon their efforts rather than potentially face litigation. Solar
access laws are also a relatively recent phenomenon. However, several cases indicate that
courts will carefully scrutinize the language of solar access laws in determining how they
impact a traditional review of an association board's decision. Statutory construction of
these laws is thus of critical importance.”).
59
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cost asymmetries will likely lead to substantive inefficiency, and our
normative recommendations seeks to lower these costs with a community
dispute resolution process.
IV. DECENTRALIZED CONFLICT RESOLUTION: ELLICKSONIAN
NORMS AND COASEAN BARGAINING
Because solar rights disputes are spatially localized — involving a small
number of solar owners and neighbors — the most applicable decentralized
resolution processes are Ellicksonian norms61 and Coasean bargaining.62 This
section briefly outlines how these processes function, focusing on the costs of
conflict resolution. These resolution costs may then be compared to the
enforcement costs of statutes.
The theory behind efficient Coasean bargaining relies on a precondition
— the assignment of property rights to either the solar party or the
developed-use party.63 Solar rights statutes existed in forty states in 2012,
largely in the form of a lesser right in land that mirrors a negative easement.64
The assignment of rights is often quite precise and varied. For example, a
statute might specify that no more than 10 percent of a solar panel may be
shaded between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. on the winter solstice
as long as the solar panel was installed before the shade-producing developed
use.65 This statute would therefore assign a negative easement whereby the
developed-use property is encumbered, such that the shading use of land
would not be pursued.
These conflicting land uses fall along a spectrum of rights, with extremes
favoring vertical development or solar rights (see Figure 1). When rights are
completely assigned to vertical development, such as in the Fontainbleau66
case, there is no statutory protection for solar rights or to prevent solar
61

See ELLICKSON, supra note 12.
See Coase, supra note 2.
63
Id.
64
Rosenthal, supra note 1, at 998.
65
Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 25982 (2015).
66
See Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
62
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shading. Conversely, the opposite spectral extreme holds for absolute solar
rights over vertical development, fully protecting the stream of benefits from
solar panels. Although many might anticipate that solar statutes award
absolute rights, this is not the case. In most states with solar rights, these
statutes have created a solar rights-leaning regime with reasonableness
standards and other disputatious protections. The solar rights regime’s
location along the spectrum can be influenced by the types of dispute
resolution processes taking place and by the costliness of enforcing one’s
solar rights.

Figure 1: Solar Rights Spectrum
Conflict arises when vertical development is perceived to be
unreasonable to the solar owner; in Figure 1, conflict would be a land-use
decision resulting in a point to the left of where the solar owner believes his
or her rights reside. A solar owner could seek government help to enforce his
or her rights by limiting the developed land use, which in Figure 1 would
mean seeking to shift the presumptive activity to the right. However, this
centralized enforcement may be expensive, relative to the value of the shift
right in Figure 1. Our hypothesis is that the shift could be accomplished
through decentralized private negotiation at a lower cost. Alternately, the
developed use owner could compensate the solar owner sufficiently to remain
at or near the left-most status quo point.
With property rights assigned, the next step in a Coasean analysis is to
assess transaction costs.67 Transaction costs involve the resources expended
to reach a formal agreement, whereby (1) the developed-use owner pays the
solar owner to endure more shading or (2) the solar owner pays the

67

Id. at 850-53; Duke, supra note 5; see also, Joshua M. Duke, Institutions and Land-Use
Conflicts: Harm, Dispute Processing, and Transactions, 38 J. Econ. Issues. 227, 234
(2004).
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developed-use owner to provide more sun than currently provided.68 For
instance, the contract might specify that the shade will be less than 10 percent
during the given hours or the shade will apply to fewer hours than the statute
specifies. Examples of transaction costs would be the costs of paying a
lawyer to draft a contract, filing documents, negotiating the price, and
enforcing the contract.69
The next step in a Coasean70 analysis is to compare the magnitude of the
total transaction costs to the potential gain from trade,71 which in this case
would be the value of the adjustments specified above. For several reasons, it
is reasonable to anticipate that in most conflicts, the transaction costs will
exceed the value of the adjustments. First, although the solar panels and
developed uses are valuable (i.e., of a magnitude greater than $10,000), the
value of the potential gains from trade will often be less because they
involved only adjustments to the rights specified in the statutes. Second, the
transaction costs are likely to be substantial (i.e., at least $1,000-$2,000)
because of the professional services that are likely to be involved.
Collectively, this Coasean analysis suggests that bargaining can deliver the
efficient level in the developed-use-versus-solar balance,72 but it is likely in
most conflicts that the status quo statutorily assigned property rights would
prevail.
Because the principal obstacle to bargaining is transaction costs, one
might hypothesize that informal, norms-driven outcomes may be at play.
Simply, the costs of reaching an informal agreement are likely to be less than
the formal-agreement transaction costs. The informal agreement costs would
involve private (and likely, bilateral) negotiation, but no contracting cost. The
main cost of informal agreements would be the costs to the victim of seeking
redress, if the other party violates the informal agreement. The costs are
analogous to contractual enforcement costs, and occur only in expectation. If
the negotiation is upheld, then these are highly efficient, privately negotiated
transactions that likely involve low or near-zero transactions costs, and likely
68

Coase, supra note 2, at 15-19; See Duke, supra note 5.
Coase, supra note 2, at 15-19; See Duke, supra note 5.
70
See Coase, supra note 2.
71
See Duke, supra note 5; Duke, supra note 67, at 234.
72
See Duke, supra note 5; Duke, supra note 67, at 234.
69
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do not involve formal easement contracts. It is possible that these informal
agreements involve private side payments or exchanged services.
There is legal-economic theory to support these informal negotiations as
an alternative to Coasean bargaining. Norms, as a field of conflict resolution,
largely draw on Ellickson’s work Order Without Law.73 After conducting
field research with farmers and ranchers in Shasta County, California,
Ellickson concluded that bargaining contexts that exist outside of legal
entitlement to initial rights create superior efficiency gains in private
negotiation.74 In fact, Ellickson juxtaposes his views with the “legal centrist
tradition,” pioneered by Thomas Hobbes,75 who argued that a non-legal
system of social control—“such as the decentralized enforcement of
norms”76—had no possibility of bringing order to a society. Coasean
arguments align with Hobbes’s, arguing that initial rights must be assigned
by the state.77 Ellickson disagrees: “Even in the parts of his article where he
took transactions costs into account, Coase failed to note that in some
contexts initial rights might arise through decentralized social processes,
rather than from law.”78 In an Ellicksonian world, there are two forms of
norms-based negotiation: those contexts in which initial rights are centrally
defined and those contexts in which they are not defined.79 When they are not
defined, it is likely that decentralized social processes often determine initial
rights. When they are defined, private bargaining likely often occurs outside
of legal entitlement to those initial rights. Ellickson argues that due to the
power of social norms and the complexities of the law, many will choose to
enforce their own express contracts without the help of the law.80
Both Coasean bargaining and Ellicksonian norms could potentially work
to resolve solar rights enforcement conflicts. With property rights defined,
73

See ELLICKSON, supra note 12.
Id. at viii (“In short, contrary to standard law-and-economics analysis, in many
contexts legal entitlements do not function as starting points for bargaining.”).
75
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 97-98, 110-113 (1st ed. 1909).
76
ELLICKSON, supra note 12, at 138.
77
Coase, supra note 2, at 15.
78
ELLICKSON, supra note 12, at 139.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 138; See also Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in
Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981).
74
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status quo rights assignment will often prevail, but when it is unsatisfactory
to one party, that party will seek an informal or formal outcome if no other,
cheaper resolution process is available. It is also possible, however, that the
parties to the conflict may (1) not fully understand the exact property rights
assigned and whether they are in compliance, or (2) will ignore the assigned
rights seeking an entirely norm-based solution. In other words, solar rights
form an important variable in negotiation with which the costs and benefits of
adjustments to the status quo are negotiated. Enforcement through courts,
though likely intended as the resolution process by those in government, may
actually be far less attractive when compared to the net benefits of using
decentralized processes.
If the government enforces solar rights with criminal actions — as
California did prior to 2008 under the Solar Shade Act — then there is little
incentive for solar owners to use private negotiation because the state bears
the enforcement cost. That is the exception, however. As most statutes simply
assign rights and then direct aggrieved solar owners to seek civil redress in
courts at their own expense, private negotiation processes have potentially
lower cost. This hypothesis is difficult to test empirically. It is largely an
unobservable phenomenon of private negotiation. Yet, the theoretical
predictions suggest that it is currently used to resolve conflicts. Further, the
government should redirect solar conflicts from courts to a facilitated private
negotiation process, which is built upon by the Coasean81 and Ellicksonian82
insights developed herein. In the following comparative institutional analysis,
lessons are drawn about how a community dispute resolution process
functions and compares to the litigated resolution in the case.
V. CASE STUDY: TESORO DEL VALLE MASTER HOMEOWNER’S
ASSOCIATION V. MARTIN GRIFFIN ET AL.
This comparative institutional analysis of the conflict leading to the case
of Tesoro del Valle Master Homeowner’s Association v. Griffin83 follows
81

See Coase, supra note 2.
See ELLICKSON, supra note 12.
83
See Tesoro Del Valle Master Homeowners Association v. Martin Griffin, 200 Cal.
App. 4th 619 (2011).
82
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methods developed by Komesar84 and extended by Duke,85 seeking to
determine the most effective resolution process to solve a specific type of
environmental conflict. By collecting “transaction” data86 adapting an
approach developed by John R. Commons and elaborated upon by Daniel W.
Bromley,87 the researchers analyzed how a resource at stake is assigned
formal property rights from an informal to fully formal property rights
regime. Comparing the effectiveness of these allocation procedures
concludes which processes are the “best of the bads” of available resolution
processes.88
This analysis compares the legislative process in terms of its passage and
enforcement of the California Solar Rights Act89 to the community dispute
resolution process in terms of both the disputants’ procedural ability to
participate and the substantive efficiency of the outcome. This allows
conclusions to be drawn about how to use these resolution processes to
achieve societal goals. This case study provides insight into a unique new
category of resolution processes that have the potential to increase
substantive efficiency in community-level solar conflicts. This analysis finds
that the community dispute resolution process is potentially relatively
effective in creating what is essentially a negotiated settlement that occurs
with low transaction costs. This finding has wide implications for
environmental policy because it represents the power of private negotiation in
resolving environmental conflicts.
A. Setting of the Conflict
The conflict setting establishes the history of human interaction with the
natural environment in the location that would eventually produce the case
study conflict. This conflict is set in the city of Santa Clarita, California.90
84

See KOMESAR, supra note 9.
See Duke, supra note 5.
86
Id.
87
John R. Commons, Institutional Economics: Its Place in Political Economy, New
Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers (1990). See also John R. Commons, Legal
Foundations of Capitalism, New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers (1995); Daniel
W. Bromley, Economic Interests and Institutions: The Conceptual Foundations of Public
Policy, Oxford: Basil Blackwell (1989).
88
See KOMESAR, supra note 9.
89
Cal. Civ. Code § 714 (2015).
90
See Tesoro Del Valle Master Homeowners Association v. Martin Griffin, 200 Cal.
85
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With a population of about 180,000, and a median household income of
$82,607,91 Santa Clarita is a vibrant and wealthy suburb of Los Angeles
situated in the northeast corner of Los Angeles County. The Santa Clarita
Valley has a mild Southern California Mediterranean climate, characterized
by warm and dry days most of the year with mild-moist winters.92
Throughout the valley, microclimates are common because of the proximity
to the Mojave Desert and Pacific Ocean, and the dry portion of fall usually
yields temperatures near 100 degrees and vulnerability to wildfires.93 The
city has a rich history steeped in early American Indians, the California Gold
Rush, the oil boom, a disastrous flood, and the early silent film era.
B. Parties and Conflicting Interests
The homes in the Tesoro del Valle development, like most other masterplanned communities, are subject to the community’s CC&Rs.94 The CC&Rs
ensure that “there shall be no construction, alteration, or removal of any
Improvement in the Project (other than repairs or rebuilding done by the
Association pursuant hereto) without the approval of the Architectural
Control Committee (ACC).”95 The CC&R’s “Design Guidelines” adopted by
the Tesoro del Valle homeowners association reserved their right under the
California Solar Rights Act96 to impose “reasonable” restrictions on solar
installations, pending review from the homeowner’s association’s ACC.97
App. 4th 619 (2011).
91
2010 U.S. Census. U.S. Census Bureau, available at
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06/0669088.html.
92
Monthly Averages for Santa Clarita, CA, October 4, 2014,
http://www.weather.com/outlook/health/achesandpains/climatology/monthly/USCA1019
?from=36hr_newslinker2.
93
Id.
94
G. C. Hansen, California Planning and Development Report (Legal Digest No. Vol. 27
No. 1, 2012), http://www.cp-dr.com/node/3100 (last visited September 21, 2014) (“In
Tesoro del Valle Master Homeowners Assn. v. Griffin, defendants Martin and Carolyn
Griffin were owners of property who sought to install a solar energy system at their
residence in a development that is subject to conditions, covenants and restrictions”).
95
Id. (“The CC&Rs provided that ‘[t]here shall be no construction, alteration, or removal
of any Improvement in the Project (other than repairs or rebuilding done by the
Association pursuant hereto) without the approval of the Architectural Control
Committee (ACC).’”).
96
See Tesoro Del Valle Master Homeowners Association v. Martin Griffin, 200 Cal.
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In 2007, defendants Martin and Carolyn Griffin decided to install a solar
PV renewable energy system on their property, which activated the conflict
in this case.98 Because the use of land for solar purposes involved a more
technologically advanced and intensive use, the Griffins are the “highintensity user” according to the typology developed by Duke.99,100,101
Tesoro’s ACC requires submission of a plot plan drawn to scale, a detailed
description of the proposed materials, a landscape plan, and a drainage plan
in order to review proposed property modification projects.102 The Griffins
submitted what was determined to be an inadequate application, which
contained “only a handwritten drawing with a rectangle signifying the
approximate location of the proposed solar panels; it did not contain
information concerning the panels' dimensions, number, or color; the setback;
the proposed alterations to the landscaping; or the amount of electricity
proposed to be generated.”103 The ACC did not approve the application, but
suggested that the roof of the casita adjacent to the home could be a potential
location for the proposed panels. Further, the ACC requested the missing
elements to the application, including the “project’s dimensions and
minimum setbacks on the site plan, how the slope beneath the solar panels
App. 4th 619 (2011).
97
D. Praw & M. Laufer, Testing the Limits of the California Solar Act (April 18, 2012),
(“The homes in Tesoro del Valle are governed by a homeowners association. The HOA,
through its CC&Rs, imposes certain customary restrictions on the homeowners that
protect the community and maintain architectural consistency.”).
98
Tesoro Del Valle Master Homeowners Association v. Martin Griffin, 200 Cal. App.
4th 619, 623 (2011) (“In 2007, appellants met with Joe Hawley, then with Advanced
Solar Electric, who gave them a proposal for the installation of a solar energy system for
their property. They told Hawley they were interested in the system being installed on the
slope adjacent to their residence. Appellants submitted an application to install a solar
energy system on October 2, 2007.”).
99
See Duke, supra note 67.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Tesoro at 624 (2011) (“The CC&Rs and Design Guidelines listed the requirements for
an application to the ACC, which included the submission of a plot plan drawn to scale, a
detailed description of the proposed materials, a landscape plan and a drainage plan.”).
103
Id. (“The Griffins’ application to the ACC for the solar system in this case did not
meet those requirements. Their application contained only a handwritten drawing with a
rectangle signifying the approximate location of the proposed solar panels; it did not
contain information concerning the panels' dimensions, number or color; the setback; the
proposed alterations to the landscaping; or the amount of electricity proposed to be
generated.”).
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would be maintained, and photographs of the existing landscape and
superimpose the proposed panel elevation.”104 The ACC denied the proposed
slope-mounted system because: (1) it was at the entry to the neighborhood;
(2) adjacent homes had a direct line of sight; and (3) the CC&R’s prohibited
slope alteration and any alteration or landscape removal that could impact
drainage.105
Tesoro’s ACC anticipated that the Griffins would submit a revised
application, however, the Griffins instead proceeded with the roof-installed
panels by signing a $97,000 contract with Advanced Solar Electric for the
installation of a 36-panel array on the roof of the home and the 22-panel
slope-mounted array.106,107 Then, after a meeting with the ACC, they
submitted a revised application for the entire project.108 The ACC reapproved
104

Id. at 625 (“Summarizing the ACC’s position, Tim Collins handwrote four comments
on appellants’ application noting that the roof of the casita adjacent to appellants’
residence should be considered as a location for the panels; that the project’s dimensions
and minimum setbacks needed to be provided on the site plan; that appellants needed to
indicate how the slope beneath the solar panels would be maintained; and that they
needed to submit photographs of the existing landscape and superimpose the proposed
panel elevation.”).
105
Id. (“The ACC was concerned about the proposed slope-mounted system because it
was at the entry to the neighborhood, adjacent homes had a direct line of sight, the
CC&R’s prohibited slope alteration and any alteration or landscape removal could impact
drainage.”).
106
Pat Murphy, Solar Energy Enthusiasts Take on Homeowners Association, and Lose |
Benchmarks, LAWYERS USA ONLINE (November 3, 2011),
http://lawyersusaonline.com/benchmarks/2011/11/03/solar-energy-enthusiasts-take-onhomeowners-association-and-lose/ (“So, despite the association’s protests, the work
started on the installation of the solar energy system. The contractor completed
installation of the entire system – including the solar panels on the slope – by the end of
March 2008.”).
107
Jon E. Goetz, Homeowners Association Has Broad Discretion To Regulate
Homeowner Installation Of Solar Panels, MARTINDALE (November 15, 2011),
http://www.martindale.com/energy/article_Kronick-Moskovitz-Tiedemann-GirardA_1374518.htm (“The Griffins decided to install 36 solar panels on their roof and 22
panels on the slope and signed a contract for installation prior to receiving approval from
the HOA…The Griffins began construction despite the HOA Board’s denial of their
application.”).
108
Tesoro at 626 (2011) (“Following a January 23, 2008 meeting between appellants,
Hawley, and Tesoro and Euclid Management representatives, appellants agreed to submit
a revised application and Tesoro agreed to review and rule on the application within one

27

NEGOTIATED SOLAR RIGHTS CONFLICT RESOLUTION
the roof installation on the new application but again denied the slope
installation.109 The Griffins installed the slope-mounted panels in spite of the
denied application, instigating the lawsuit brought by Tesoro’s homeowner’s
association seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.110
The resource at stake is the use of air and sunlight above the Griffins’
private home as well as the slope on their private property in the Tesoro
subdivision. The high-intensity use, the installation of the solar array on the
roof and on the slope adjacent to the house, triggered conflict because it is
seen to be causing an aesthetic disamenity to the neighbors — who the
homeowner’s association represents.111 The disamenity involves glare and
unsightliness of the solar array, lowering the neighbor’s enjoyment of their
property. This disamenity, as well as the potential resulting reductions in
property values borne by the neighbors resulting from the installation of the
solar array, have the hallmarks of an externality, or shifted cost, borne by the
neighbors in the Tesoro community when the Griffins install the solar array.
The Griffins’ interests perhaps stemmed from the desire to reduce their
carbon footprint and their dependence on the utility company, perhaps net
metering benefits, and to make a long-run financial return on their $97,000
investment. These interests, though many would consider them noble, impose
an external cost on Tesoro. Nevertheless, to restrain the Griffins would result
in costs being borne by them.

week. The supplemental application added the installation of solar panels on the roof.”).
109
Id. (“On January 29, 2008, the ACC denied the supplemental application in part,
specifically disapproving the installation of solar panels on the slope and directing
appellants to return the slope to its original condition. The ACC remained concerned
about the same issues that led to the denial of the initial application, including that
appellants had not considered alternative locations.”).
110
California Court Upholds Solar Energy Restrictions of Homeowners Association,
(September 21, 2014), http://www.environmental-law.net/2012/01/california-courtupholds-solar-energy-restrictions-of-homeowners-association/ (“However, the ACC
rejected the application and ordered the defendants to restore the slope outside its
perimeter wall. Tesoro subsequently a filed a lawsuit, seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief.”).
111
The property owners, as well as all people who receive direct and existence benefits
from knowing that this particular home is powered by renewable energy rather than
conventional power, henceforth known as “the Griffins,” are the high-intensity user of the
resource at stake.
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Tesoro is comprised of the Griffins’ neighbors in the Tesoro del Valle
community and is represented by the Tesoro del Valle Master Homeowner’s
Association and its respective committees. Tesoro is the low-intensity user,
seeking to maintain the airspace and sunlight above the home and the slope in
the condition created by the initial construction of the development and,
thereby, to prevent the solar array from being installed.
According to the opinion handed down by Court of Appeals Judge,
Randy Rhodes, “Tesoro is a nonprofit mutual benefit corporation that
manages, administers, maintains, preserves and operates the residences and
common areas in the Tesoro community.”112 In doing so, the homeowner’s
association established and enforces the CC&Rs, with the stated purpose to
“enhance and protect the value, desirability and attractiveness of the Tesoro
community.”113 These interests of the homeowner’s association represent the
interests of the residents of the Tesoro del Valle community, as they seek the
same ends for their own private property in the community.
Tesoro’s constituency seeks to coordinate the ways that other members of
the community are able to enjoy land uses and modifications to their real
property in order to maintain property values. Uncoordinated uses would
likely give rise to external costs. These external costs can create a disamenity
and lower neighboring property values, as well as cause the overall
community’s value to decline due to a lack of coordination in use and future
expectations of use.
In this conflict, Tesoro is seeking to limit the aesthetic externality the
Griffins’ solar installation imposed on neighbors. Pursuant to the California
Solar Rights Act,114 Tesoro’s CC&Rs reiterate in Section 8.1.18 that all
property modifications must be approved by the ACC.115 Specifically relating
to the rules on slopes on different properties, the CC&Rs state that “no
structure, planting, fencing, . . . [may] interfere with established slope ratios,
create erosion or sliding problems, or which may change the direction of flow
of drainage channels or obstruct or retard the flow of water through drainage
112
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channels.”116 This clause assigns the right to Tesoro to regulate the specific
listed elements of the Griffins’ stream of benefits. The conflict stems from
the inherent legal conflict between the institutions created by the California
Solar Rights Act and the CC&Rs in the Tesoro community. Due to its vague
technical nature, it is unlikely that the “reasonableness” clause in the
California Solar Rights Act117 had yet been tested before this case.
VI. THE COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS METHOD
The environmental transactions data presented below are an analytical
method developed by Duke, building on Bromley and Commons, that
dovetails with the comparative institutional analysis methodology developed
by Komesar.118,119 The analysis evaluates highly imperfect conflict resolution
processes on their relative ability to achieve social goals, such as fairness and
efficiency.120,121 This article defines fairness in terms of ability to participate,
while efficiency is the substantive efficiency of the outcome. The ability to
participate includes the opportunity to be heard by an impartial decision
maker. Substantive efficiency requires that the property rights at stake be
allocated to the highest and best use, or social efficiency. In this article,
where all affected parties’ interests are collected into two disputing parties,
resource allocation efficiency is achieved when the property rights at stake
are allocated to the highest valued user.122
The comparative institutional analysis methodology also incorporates
Komesar’s “participation-centered approach,” which analyzes the “benefits
and costs of participation” in the conflict resolution process and each party’s
ability to bear the costs.123 Some of these costs may include “average per
capita stakes, information costs, contracting costs, enforcement costs,
116
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organizational costs, group cohesiveness, sophistication, wealth, and number
of members in each party.”124 The participation-centered approach will be
discussed in further detail below.
Seeking to determine which resolution process is the “best of the
bads,”125 this analysis will compare legislative action in the form of the
California Solar Rights Act126 to the hybrid resolution process that is part
alternative dispute resolution and part market process. This hybrid process
will be termed a community dispute resolution process, which will enforce
the contractually binding CC&Rs of the Tesoro del Valle Master
Homeowner’s Association. The legislative action in California protecting the
property rights of homeowners wishing to purchase a solar installation is
dealt a serious blow by the appellate decision in this case, as the
homeowner’s association’s ACC (here, the vehicle of the community dispute
resolution process) undercuts the authority of the California Solar Rights
Act’s standards of reasonableness.127 These two dispute resolution processes
juxtapose the power of top-down institutional power and bottom-up
negotiation as methods to bring about conflict resolution over solar rights in a
cost-effective manner.
VII. ENVIRONMENTAL TRANSACTIONS DATA
In order to perform the comparative institutional analysis, data were
collected to delineate the environmental transactions128 that occurred over the
resource at stake. These transactions contain events that conditionally assign
rights to the conflicting interest parties; the parties to the conflict enter the
Hohfeldian129 formal rights regime when conditional rights have been
assigned.130 These transactions begin before the resource conflict emerged
(nonactivation), and continue until the ultimate formal property rights
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assignment. Each of these transactions consists of a resolution process, a
transaction issue, and a conditional rights outcome.131
Prior to 1978, when the first solar rights were assigned in California,132
the resource at stake was not yet activated. In other words, the developed-use
versus solar access conflict did not exist, as there was nothing to stop either
party from pursuing their desired use of the resource. This is a Hohfeldian
presumptive property rights regime;133,134 in economic terms, the resource at
stake has no value — i.e., is not scarce by default.135 The conflict issue in this
market-based transaction is whether either party will act on a Hohfeldian
privilege136, 137 to engage in high-intensity use of the resource at stake. In
these pre-statute years, neither the Griffins’ predecessor in interest nor the
predecessors in interest of the neighbors pursued use of the resource at stake.
In 1978, the California State Assembly passed the California Solar Rights
Act.138 The legislation was designed to protect the rights of homeowners in
master-planned communities to install solar photovoltaic energy systems on
their property:
(a) Any covenant, restriction, or condition contained
in any deed, contract, security instrument, or other instrument
affecting the transfer or sale of, or any interest in, real
property that effectively prohibits or restricts the installation
or use of a solar energy system is void and unenforceable. 139
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This Act does allow the CC&Rs to include provisions that impose
“reasonable” restrictions on installations, which are defined in Section
714 of California Civil Code as those that do not increase the cost or
decrease the energy efficiency of the system by more than 20 percent.140
The statute’s language on reasonableness reads:
(b) This section does not apply to provisions that impose
reasonable restrictions on solar energy systems. However, it
is the policy of the state to promote and encourage the use of
solar energy systems and to remove obstacles thereto.
Accordingly, reasonable restrictions on a solar energy system
are those restrictions that do not significantly increase the cost
of the system or significantly decrease its efficiency or
specified performance, or that allow for an alternative system
of comparable cost, efficiency, and energy conservation
benefits.
and
Notwithstanding Section 714, any association, as defined in
Section 1351, may impose reasonable provisions which:
(a) Restrict the installation of solar energy systems installed
in common areas, as defined in Section 1351, to those
systems approved by the association.
(b) Require the owner of a separate interest, as defined in
Section 1351, to obtain the approval of the association for the
installation of a solar energy system in a separate interest
owned by another.
(c) Provide for the maintenance, repair, or replacement of
roofs or other building components.
140
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(d) Require installers of solar energy systems to indemnify or
reimburse the association or its members for loss or damage
caused by the installation, maintenance, or use of the solar
energy system.141
These benchmarks create significant property rights for solar
owners and place corresponding duties on neighbors (represented by the
homeowner’s associations). The California Solar Rights Act142 created an
adjudicative process for solar owners to overcome restrictions in the
homeowners associations’ CC&Rs and to install solar PV systems on
their homes in homeowners’ association-regulated communities. In
allowing for reasonable restrictions at the twenty percent mark, the Act
strongly favors assignment of property rights to solar owners. One key
aspect of the Act involves enforcement:
(e) Whenever approval is required for the installation or
use of a solar energy system, the application for approval
shall be processed and approved by the appropriate
approving entity in the same manner as an application for
approval of an architectural modification to the property,
and shall not be willfully avoided or delayed.
(f) Any entity, other than a public entity, that willfully
violates this section shall be liable to the applicant or
other party for actual damages occasioned thereby, and
shall pay a civil penalty to the applicant or other party in
an amount not to exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000).
(g) In any action to enforce compliance with this section,
the prevailing party shall be awarded reasonable
attorney's fees.
(h) (1) A public entity that fails to comply with this
section may not receive funds from a state-sponsored
grant or loan program for solar energy. A public entity
shall certify its compliance with the requirements of this
141
142

9.2 Cal. Civ. Code § 714 and 714.1.
Id.

34

JOURNAL OF ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY LAW VOL. 22, NO. 1
section when applying for funds from a state-sponsored
grant or loan program.143
The enforcement language of the California Solar Rights Act is vague,
passing the burden of specific enforcement procedures on to local
governments. As was detailed above, the brief and non-representative set of
phone contacts made to state and local governments in California144 implied
that few local governments have experience with the enforcement of solar
rights, and it is apparent that they have not interpreted the vague language of
the California Solar Rights Act145 to handle enforcement. This suggests it is
likely that any disputes of this nature are settled privately.
In addition to this principal statute, there are several other statutes in
California assigning property rights to solar owners. There are solar easement
laws, local zoning enabling legislation for solar protection, and the
aforementioned solar shading law.146 Following the legislation, several other
transactions occurred that affected the conflict.
In 1996,147 the former 1,795-acre Clougherty Ranch, now owned by
Montalvo Properties, was re-zoned for residential development. This was a
local legislative transaction in the form of zoning allocated property rights
with the intention of controlling and directing the use of property within
Santa Clarita County. The purpose of zoning is to ensure that residential,
commercial, and industrial property uses remain separate to minimize
externalities between different categories of land use. This zoning decision
specifically allowed the developer, Montalvo Properties, to develop the land
into a CID. In terms of market value, this developed use is undoubtedly of
greater marketed net benefits than the ranch’s use; but it is probably the
highest-valued social use of the property, too. This only has an indirect effect
on the resource at stake because the development that results from this zoning
leads the slope and its sunlight to become scarce. There is no clear rights
allocation loser in this situation.
143
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A few years after construction began and the Tesoro del Valle community
started selling homes in the unfinished development community, the CC&Rs,
including the portion of its charter that established the ACC, were filed with
the recorder of deeds of Santa Clarita County.148 Recording the CC&Rs is an
environmental transaction in this approach to the comparative institutional
analysis method because it established Tesoro’s property right to regulate
housing lot modifications and construction within the community —
modifications that include solar arrays. This does not exhibit undue control
over the Griffins in these cases because they must voluntarily subject
themselves to the forfeiture of these rights and to the associated stream of
benefits in order to purchase the home.
Approximately six months later, in December 2003, the ACC ratified its
“Design Guidelines” for the forthcoming Tesoro del Valle community.149
This transaction is also considered to be a community dispute resolution
process. Similar to the transaction establishing the CC&Rs, the issue
regarding the design guidelines was as follows: Do the design guidelines
imposed by the Tesoro del Valle Master Homeowner’s Association provide
for the “reasonable” regulation of home improvement projects within the
community? In this transaction, as in the previous transaction where the
Griffins purchased their home in the Tesoro del Valle community, they
accepted that they did not have full rights to make improvements to their
property, but instead were subject to the approval of the ACC in accordance
with the design guidelines.
On November 8, 2007, the Griffins’ application to install the solar array
was denied by the ACC because it was incomplete.150 Again, this transaction
falls under the community dispute resolution process framework. When the
Griffins agreed to the CC&Rs and design guidelines upon moving into the
home, they also accepted Tesoro’s right to approve the solar array installation
148
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through the ACC. The denial of Griffins’ application created a legal duty
with respect to the solar panels.
The same day the Griffins were denied application, they signed a contract
with Advanced Solar Electric for the installation of a solar array totaling
$97,000, and shortly thereafter oversaw the installation of the solar array on
the slope outside the perimeter wall of their property.151 This action appeared
to violate the duty to seek community permission — an “illegal externality”
or a failed type of market transaction in the Duke typology.152,153 In terms of
property rights analysis, the Griffins assumed the right to the high-intensity
use of the slope and its sunlight rather than respecting the rights of the
community articulated through the CC&Rs. The Tesoro community had to
bear the temporary negative aesthetic costs of the panels, as well as perhaps
reduced property values, until the property rights conflict could be settled.
The Tesoro ACC brought suit against the Griffins for breach of
contract,154 and on July 13, 2009, the Los Angeles County Superior Court
ruled in favor of Tesoro.155 The court held that the Griffins breached their
contractual obligation to abide by the CC&Rs by installing a solar energy
system on their property despite the denial of their application. In support of
this claim, the Court of Appeals decision held that Tesoro complied with the
CC&Rs, while the Griffins “were not entitled to any relief and were required
to remove the 22 solar panels from their hillside slope.” 156 The California
Court of Appeals found that the Griffins’ appeal on the reasonableness
standards of the California Solar Rights Act was a question of fact for the
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jury, not one of law, and that they impermissibly attempted to reverse this
distinction on appeal.157
The decision also cites a precedent-setting case in this arena, whose
outcome results in reasonableness standards being set as a question of fact.158
As a result of this decision, the Tesoro neighbors secured a formal right to
manage the resource at stake — the ability to install or prevent the
installation of a solar array — in accordance with the CC&R contract that the
Griffins signed, limiting the rights the Griffins’ had to install a solar energy
system, and specifically a restriction not to install on the slope.
The Griffins appealed the decision, but, on October 3, 2011, the
California Court of Appeals also sided with Tesoro because the CC&Rs were
ruled not to “unreasonably” regulate solar-array installations.159 In the final
judicial transaction, the California Appellate Court held that the Griffins
would be forced to remove the portion of the solar array on the slope outside
their perimeter wall because it violated the CC&Rs.
Thus, the transactions in this case study ultimately resulted in a nuanced
property rights allocation; the solar rights owner was afforded some solar
access rights, but not in ways that overly diminished the aesthetic
expectations of neighbors as articulated through CC&Rs. With reference to
Figure 1, the expensive enforcement action clarified that this solar rights
regime existed between the two extremes of total developed use rights and
total solar owner rights. The nuanced allocation offers some evidence that
solar conflicts might arise because the solar owner thinks that solar rights
statutes provide more complete property rights than they actually do. The
nuanced allocation, in addition, suggests that expensive enforcement will
result in a sharing of benefits and burdens. This further suggests that conflicts
might be resolved in a win-win pattern — or one that attenuates any absolute
rights to any one party. This case study, however, suggested that determining
the shared benefit and burden outcome required costly litigation. The
157
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normative section below discusses whether this outcome might be available
directly from the CID building upon their CC&Rs, or what we call the
community dispute resolution process. The article next turns to a
specification of the final rights allocation and then an analysis of the
processes used to determine this allocation.
VIII. PROPERTY RIGHTS ANALYSIS AND HOHFELDIAN CORRELATES
The conflict in Tesoro del Valle Master Homeowner’s Association160
centers on the relative power of neighbors to use homeowner’s associations
to assert their property rights using CC&Rs. Specifically, when the CC&Rs
seem to conflict with the statutory rights assigned to solar owners for the
installation of solar PV panels under the California Solar Rights Act of
1978.161 The informal Hohfeldian162 correlates in this case shed light on the
positions of both parties in relation to the property right in question.
Specifically, the Griffins were the high-intensity user and thus the privileged
party in the presumptive rights regime. The party of no right was Tesoro,
who must move to formal conflict resolution in order to contest the Griffins’
presumption of the right to install the panels.
The California Court of Appeals, Second District, denied the Griffins’
appeal. Judge Rhodes wrote that the Griffins were “unmindful of applicable
standards of review” in writing the appeal and affirmed the trial court and
jury’s decision to grant declaratory and injunctive relief to Tesoro.163 The
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment that the CC&Rs, and
their application, were considered satisfactory for the definition of
reasonableness under the California Solar Rights Act.164 This required the
Griffins to pay to remove the contended panels (those on the slope adjacent
160
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to their home), and to restore the drainage of the slope to its original
condition.165 With respect to the panels on the slope, the Griffins became the
duty-bearer in the Hohfeldian166 formal rights regime that resulted from the
enforced CC&Rs.
The Tesoro neighbors won the case and, as a result, were awarded the
property right for the development community to maintain their property
values without bearing the cost of the aesthetic externality caused by the
visible and reflective panels on the slope at the edge of their property. The
homeowner’s association was responsible for maintaining the homogeneity
of the community’s appearance and protecting the value of the equally zoned
residential properties, and could do so through the result of the conflict
resolution. As a result, the Tesoro neighbors became the right-holding party
in the Hohfeldian167 formal rights regime.
IX. COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
The case study data can be used to provide broader insight about what
happens when two different institutions assign formal property rights in
conflict — but also when one institution specifies a “reasonableness”
standard to handle inconsistencies. Beginning in a rights regime characterized
by solar statutes, there are two competing conflict resolution processes for
enforcement: the judicial system alone and local CC&Rs followed by the
courts. These processes carry differing procedures, goals, and participation
costs. Courts assign rights at high cost, while community-level dispute
resolution seeks to reach a final allocation of rights efficiently through
negotiated settlements at very low transaction and enforcement costs.
Because there is a differential between the costs of participating in each of
these resolution processes, the point of comparison is costs of enforcement.
The statutory assignment of rights to solar owners was previously argued
to be a powerful force in determining rights and also a new and growing
force in the United States. On the other hand, developed uses were also
implied to be a waning force. This case study suggests that voluntary,
165
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market-based restrictions on rights – in this case, CC&Rs – may be one
vehicle for developed uses to restrict solar rights.
A. Participation-Centered Approach
In Komesar’s participation-centered approach, the “benefits and costs of
participation”168 are analytical constructs. An example of the benefits of
participation is the ability to defend one’s interests within a resolution
process and secure a valuable right. The extent to which the process protects
the procedural rights of both parties can be used as a benchmark by which to
assess its fairness, here defined as the ability to participate.169 That is not to
say that all processes strive for access to full participation for all parties.
Market externalities are, by definition, inequitable to the victims of pollution.
Or, as many in the law and economics school of thought argue, courts largely
deliver efficient outcomes.170 The costs of participation can occur as
transaction costs (in markets), lobbying costs (in legislatures), or litigation
costs (in courts).171 These costs might also include the costs of organizing a
party, of negotiation between parties, or of enforcement or maintenance of a
resulting institutional decision.172 In many environmental conflicts, these
costs often impede the low-intensity user of a resource at stake from
participating fully and challenging the privileged user.173 Although the costs
of assigning solar rights via statutes are low, there is an asymmetry in the
costs of enforcing those rights between the two studied resolution processes.
The case study suggests that the community dispute resolution processes
offered less expensive participation for both parties.
When the Griffins bought their home in the Tesoro del Valle community
in 2005, they purchased the property subject to limitations in the scope of
uses in the CC&Rs. The legal question was whether the Griffins violated
these terms when they installed the solar array without prior permission from
the ACC. It is clear that their ability to participate in this process — which
168

See KOMESAR, supra note 12.
See Duke, supra note 66.
170
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (Wolters Kluwer Law &
Business: Aspen Publishers, 7th ed. 2007).
171
See Duke, supra note 67.
172
See Komesar, supra note 9.
173
Id.
169

41

NEGOTIATED SOLAR RIGHTS CONFLICT RESOLUTION
combines elements of voluntary markets (land purchase) and a decentralized,
market-based dispute resolution (CC&Rs) — is relatively high. In the
language of the participation-centered approach,174 the Griffins had a
concentrated interest, high stakes per capita, low organization costs, and high
cohesiveness.175 The Griffins likely had a commensurate level of financial
resources as their neighbors, though the homeowner’s association collects
many neighbors’ interests into a single decision making unit, which likely
provides an advantage in association votes and in overcoming the costs of
litigation. Indeed, the Griffins’ association dues were likely used, in part, to
pursue the legal case against them. However, the current estimated value of
the Griffins’ property at time of this writing, about $1.2 million,176 as well as
the $96,000 cost of the solar installation,177 suggested that the Griffins were
less likely than the average household to be constrained by participation
costs.
The Tesoro community is the low-intensity user, whose interests focus on
reducing and eliminating external costs from other neighbors and mutually
maintaining, or increasing, their property values by not allowing the Griffins
to further develop this portion of their land with solar panels. The Tesoro
homeowner’s association is a highly concentrated interest. Like the Griffins’
house, the neighborhood consists of relatively expensive housing. Tesoro’s
homeowner’s association is also organized in that it is represented by the
ACC and thus has a specialized mechanism to process applications for
property modifications in the community — which effectively makes it, a
catalytic subgroup.178 Both the Griffins and Tesoro likely possess sufficient
abilities to participate in the resolution processes.
The ability to participate in procedural conflict resolution involves the
opportunity to be heard by an impartial decision maker and to face a similar
174
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distribution of the benefits and burdens within a conflict resolution
process.179 The variance of the distribution of benefits and burdens
throughout the conflict resolution process and their final distribution between
the parties once the buyer and the seller have been established reveals the
balance of procedural ability to participate and the substantive result of
participation: effectively, a comparison of the ends and the means. In Tesoro
del Valle Master Homebuilders Association, the legislative resolution process
had a superior ability to protect the social goal of procedural fairness than the
homeowner’s association’s ACC community dispute resolution process.
However, when enforcement of these equitable results is considered, the
result is not so clear.
The legislative resolution process in this conflict is the 1978 California
Solar Rights Act. The Act created a framework that allowed homeowners to
enter an adjudicative process to usurp the CC&Rs of their homeowner’s
associations and install solar installations on their homes in homeowner’s
association-regulated communities. It is also designed to protect the interests
of homeowners and their rights to install solar energy systems.180 The Act
also coordinates expectations among all solar owners (existing and potential)
and all neighbors - an important purpose given the common law tradition
favoring developed uses. The Act “balances the needs of individual solar
energy system owners with other property owners by developing solar access
rights.”181 However, the Solar Rights Act does allow CC&Rs to include
provisions that impose “reasonable” restrictions on installations, which are
defined in California Civil Code § 714 as those that do not increase the cost
or decrease the energy efficiency of the system by more than twenty
percent.182 This balancing, however, is skewed eighty percent in favor of the
solar owner and twenty percent in favor of the neighbors, based on the Act’s
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standard of reasonableness.183
The Design Guidelines adopted by the Tesoro del Valle homeowners’
association reserved its right under the California Solar Rights Act to impose
“reasonable” restrictions on solar installations, pending review from the
homeowner’s association’s ACC.184 Although the provisions of the Act185 fall
heavily in favor of the homeowner — especially with respect to common law
precedent — a neighbor’s ability to participate is not necessarily limited by
the initial assignment of rights. The owners of developed uses also had the
ability to (1) pursue their uses prior to the Act, and (2) have their voices
heard at the legislature. The twenty percent concession suggests that these
voices were heard at the legislature. Furthermore, the weak enforcement
mechanisms accompanying the rights allocation suggests that solar owners
had less influence in the legislative resolution process than initially assumed.
Compared to the relative performance of the Tesoro ACC community
dispute resolution process, the California Solar Rights Act at first appears
better positioned to defend parties’ ability to participate because it is
universally applied across the state of California. Owners, regardless of
resources, had their perspectives recognized by the legislative process, while
the community dispute resolution process places additional hurdles on
participation. However, when poorly centralized enforcement of legislated
rights is considered, the two processes seem rather similar in terms of the
disputants’ abilities to participate. While the establishment of the CC&Rs by
the homeowner’s association and the Design Guidelines by the ACC are only
contractually binding to those who agree with full knowledge to accept and
abide by them and voluntarily live in the Tesoro community, these CC&Rs
and Design Guidelines do not maintain an equal standard of participation
183
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ability. This is because they are highly subjective to the interpretation of the
decision makers on the ACC, which is comprised of other members of the
Tesoro community who have a vested interest in not being harmed by the
externality of the Griffins’ solar panels. The members of the ACC are by no
means an impartial body, and therefore may discolor the ease of entry present
in their quasi-alternative dispute resolution or quasi-market resolution
process. The California Solar Rights Act also exhibits limitations in
procedural fairness arising at the enforcement stage.186 Although the
community dispute resolution process also has procedural limitations that
vary with income, it is difficult to say that one is clearly superior when
enforcement is considered.
B. Substantive Efficiency Analysis
This section follows the economic-efficiency analytical approach in
Duke, which is built on the Coasean analysis of efficiency.187 The analysis
begins by establishing which of the conflicting parties is the highest-valued
user of the resource at stake. This determination must be made on a case-bycase basis. As stated, according to the Coase Theorem, if there are positive
transaction costs and the conditional right is not assigned to the highestvalued user, the outcome will be inefficient.188, Here, as in Komesar’s
Imperfect alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and Public
Policy, substantive efficiency “reflects an allocation of resources that
maximizes the value of social product.”189 Coasean efficiency simply means
that the final right holder pursues a use of the resource at stake that results in
the greatest gains for society.190 In the case of solar conflicts, if there are
large relative transaction costs, then the social product will be larger if the
rights are assigned to the party with the highest valued use.
This conflict presents an atypical assignment of the high-intensity user
and the low-intensity user.191 In most conflicts in environmental law, the
186
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high-intensity user is more sophisticated, wealthy, and organized, with a high
concentration of interest and acting upon privilege, while the low-intensity
user is often disorganized. However, in Tesoro del Valle Master Homeowners
Association, the high intensity users are the Griffins, seeking to develop the
slope on their property with a solar installation, and therefore the highest
valued user.192 Consequently, the low intensity user is Tesoro, who represents
the neighbors who are interested in the slope returning back to its previous,
undeveloped state or at least securing a compensatory payment.
In the legislative-legal resolution process, transaction costs are quite high,
whereas the community dispute resolution process has little to no transaction
costs. This is a key insight of this case for a broader analysis — and one that
likely applies in other solar disputes taking place in common interest
developments (“CIDs”). Therefore, according to Coase, it is important that
the legislative-legal process assign the initial allocation of rights to the
highest valued user, if substantive efficiency is to be achieved.193 However,
in the community dispute resolution process, the initial allocation of rights
ought to have no effect on the final allocation of rights, or on social
efficiency. Thus the community dispute resolution will be more likely to
deliver efficient results — regardless of who holds the highest valued use.
The efficiency of the legislative-legal in the case study necessarily
depends on whether a process tends to assign rights to the highest-valued
user. The value of the Griffins’ use of the solar PV installation is at least
$96,000, the cost of the system.194 Additionally, they will accumulate cost
savings on their electricity bill each month, potentially gain benefits from net
metering, and enjoy non-pecuniary existence benefits because they have a
reduced carbon footprint. These direct and existence benefits extend to others
who gain a small amount of utility from simply knowing there is a solar
installation on the Griffins’ house in Santa Clarita in the form of existence
values, which are higher than one may suspect because there is a very large
population who gain even a small benefit from this knowledge.
The value of Tesoro’s use of the land and its sunlight is likely lower,
192
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represented by the lack of lost property value for the neighbors due to the
panels’ unsightliness and glare. Additionally, Tesoro’s use of the land results
in smaller nonuse benefits because that small plot of land is not being
developed and is remaining in a, arguably, natural state. Based on these
results, the balance of evidence suggests that the Griffins are the highest
valued users of the resource at stake. In other solar disputes in CIDs,
however, one would suspect that the balance of valued interests might tip
against the solar owner.
The substantive efficiency of the California Solar Rights Act is low
because, although it assigns more complete rights to the highest valued user,
it does not enforce them well.195 The lack of enforcement is a transaction
cost.196 Although the Griffins were the highest valued user in their conflict,
this is not always the case. Because the legislative enforcement resolution
process has high transaction costs, overall social efficiency of the current
legislative-legal process in this case study is suboptimal. The ability of the
Act to result in maximum resource allocation efficiency is lost because of
these high transaction costs in information, contracting, and especially
enforcement.197 Because the Act carries the rule of law, it is difficult and
expensive to enforce evenly and justly, especially across a large state such as
California.198
The community dispute resolution process represented by the ACC is
superior, because, barring complete and total non-compliance, the process
essentially becomes a simple bargaining market transaction, when transaction
costs are very low. This is a suggestive result for Coasean bargaining, but it
also applies to less-formally resolved conflicts. As Ellickson argues, legally
binding dispute resolution processes can often be avoided in favor of
negotiating with informal norms while still reaching socially efficient
outcomes.199 His empirical research showed a remarkable trend: the law is
often far less important in dispute resolution than previously assumed.200
Similar to Ellickson’s research, conducted in nearby Shasta County,
195

Cal. Civ. Code § 714 (2015).
See Coase, supra note 2.
197
Cal. Civ. Code § 714 (2015).
198
Id.
199
See ELLICKSON, supra note 12, at 282.
200
Id. at 113, 147-149.
196

47

NEGOTIATED SOLAR RIGHTS CONFLICT RESOLUTION
California, the ACC creates a largely informal bargaining process that must
operate inside the law, thus greatly increasing transaction costs, when there is
a need to enforce a non-compliant breach of contract. However, this normsbased argument has the potential to leave final rights assignments to the law,
and go directly to a market process to re-allocate property rights in a conflict
with low transaction costs. Here, the ACC could bargain or negotiate with the
Griffins over the conditions under which they could build the panels. For
example, with an agreement to compensate their neighbors for the aesthetic
externality they would create. The community dispute resolution process is
therefore considered to maintain a greater degree of substantive efficiency
than the legislative process.
C. Descriptive Policy Analysis
The central claim of this analysis of the case study is that there exist
unrecognized enforcement costs of statutorily assigned solar rights that
undercut the performance of the legislative resolution process. This is a topic
that appears to be underappreciated in the legal literature on solar rights.
Because statutes have the potential to assign initial rights to the lowest valued
user and because there are significant transaction costs in resolution through
courts, the Coasean conclusion follows that the final allocation of rights will
not necessarily be efficient.201 Indeed, it is very challenging for solar owners
to enforce their rights.
In contrast, the case study also shows that community dispute resolution
processes reflected in the CC&Rs — although working against the solar
interests in this case — have a surprisingly great potential to resolve solar
conflicts with low transaction costs. Moreover, the CC&R process shows that
a nuanced property rights outcome was produced, one in which the solar
owner and the neighbors both were awarded property rights. This result
suggests the potential benefits of a more fully developed community dispute
resolution process.
Of particular interest in the comparative institutional analysis of Tesoro
del Valle Master Homeowner’s Association, one sees that the transaction
costs are lower at the neighborhood conflict-resolution level. The analysis
suggests that this results in a related advantage with respect to procedural
201
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fairness. In sum, the asymmetry between the enforcement costs of statutes in
courts and the transaction costs of private negotiation suggests that
community dispute resolution may be a better way to resolve residential solar
conflicts in terms of both participation and efficiency.
X. NORMATIVE POLICY ANALYSIS
This section outlines ways in which the community dispute resolution
process might be formally incorporated into the enforcement provisions of
solar statutes so as to take advantage of the comparative institutional analysis
results. We envision a process akin to alternative dispute resolution with
enabling legislation supporting outcomes that are enforceable contracts. In
other words, this is a quasi-alternative dispute resolution process that relies
on local nongovernmental bodies to resolve disputes pursuant to private
contracts and local, state, and federal laws outside formal legal resolution.
A key aspect of this new conflict resolution process is the necessity of
local community stakeholders to be represented in the process, regardless of
level of the stakes-per-capita. Barring total non-compliance, which requires
formal litigation, this legislative-community dispute resolution process
enables the parties to reach a highly efficient outcome with low transaction
costs if both parties submit to the authority of the private body and the statute
or binding contract backing the body’s authority. In Tesoro del Valle Master
Homeowner’s Association, the private body responsible for administering
this decision is the homeowners association and its ACC. Similar options
include local government (city council, town board, community associations,
etc.), a municipal mediation service, or even creation of a local-level
certification for arbiters specializing in solar rights disputes.
Additionally, it is possible to align with Ellickson’s and Klein & Leffler’s
view and provide no framework, allowing the initial assignment of rights to
be left to social norms, and for negotiation to occur privately.202 The
community dispute resolution process has the potential to be a highly
effective method of dispute resolution at the community level, which results
in substantively efficient outcomes. Some of the technical levers involved in
202
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private negotiation include location, azimuth, square footage, percentage of
allowable shading, and even the albedo of the panels. States could develop
standardized “negotiation sheets” for less-experienced community dispute
resolution disputants to negotiate over.
From an economic perspective, this market-based solution likely involves
negotiating side payments to homes in the viewshed of the array, possibly in
the form of a proportion of energy savings, a portion of Solar Renewable
Energy Credits (“SREC”) sales, or perhaps a subsidy from the Federal
Investment Tax Credit benefits.203 However, the informal creation of what is
effectively a private easement market depends on neighbors who are willing
to negotiate and reach a socially efficient outcome. Colleen Kettles has
delineated a list of well-defined factors that could be involved with a solar
easement.204
XI. CONCLUSION
The comparative institutional analysis method seeks to determine the
most efficient resolution process to solve a specific type of environmental
conflict.205 By tracking the transactions data for a resource at stake from nonactivation to final market outcome, it is possible to make defensible
determinations regarding the “best of the bads” of available and appropriate
resolution processes.206 Comparing the legislative-litigation process under the
California Solar Rights Act to the CC&R enforcement and the related, newly
titled community dispute resolution process in terms of these metrics, allows
conclusions to be drawn about how to use these resolution processes to better
meet societal goals.
Both the California Solar Rights Act and the homeowner’s association
ACC have merits in terms of procedural fairness and substantive efficiency.
However, in this conflict — which was the California Solar Rights Act’s first
test — the legislative resolution process was less successful in enforcing the
203
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rights of the solar owner as it is intended to do. The community dispute
resolution process was superior to the legislative because it allows disputants
to participate and lowers transaction costs. This is more likely to lead to
efficient outcomes, regardless of who holds the highest valued use.
The case study suggests a unique new category of resolution process that
has the potential to greatly increased substantive efficiency in communitylevel conflicts. The community dispute resolution process is effective in
creating what is essentially a market or informal negotiation that occurs with
low transaction costs. These private and pseudo-private negotiations
represent a potential means to an efficient end in conflicts that involve a
community structure in which most or all of the associated parties in the
community have at least a low-valued use of the resource at stake.
Particularly in conflicts that involve majorities with low per-capita stakes or
even dormant majorities, the parties’ ability to participate207 will not be
hindered as much as in an alternate resolution process. Additionally, this
research dovetails with Ellickson’s208 conclusions about informal norms,
excepting the fact that the community dispute resolution process might also
include a binding legal contract.
This finding has wide implications for environmental policy because it
represents the power of markets and informal negotiation to solve
environmental conflicts. If markets value the environment without creating
externalities, resource extraction rates and use rates will be sustainable and
efficient. There is difficulty in accurate measurement of the economic values
of ecosystem services, non-use values, and other related theorized values on
the environment, but using the judgment of people who have a direct stake in
the conflict as members of the community, despite their slight personal bias,
will allow fair determinations of highest-valued uses. Highest-valued use
determinations are likely to arise from the community dispute resolution
process. Support for similar community boards in situations where all
members of the community have a stake in the conflict (such as in a
development community in which each owns property) is a powerful tool.
Community governance of environmental conflicts allows those directly
affected to have a low cost “say” in the decision-making process, a valuable
207
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tool for low per-capita stake conflicts and an especially powerful force in
forwarding environmental justice in low-income communities.
To make this resolution process even fairer, California could mobilize a
small force of state planners to help facilitate these types of community
disputes. If an impartial third party can establish the percentage loss of
efficiency and percentage increase in cost, the community board can use
these data to make decisions within the context of the private contracts and
the California Solar Rights Act. This new method of resolving environmental
conflicts can be a highly powerful tool for assigning rights and creating
market outcomes without the need for adjudication.
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